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Abstract 
Permissions control accesses to critical resources on Android. Any weaknesses from their exploitation can be of 
great interest to attackers. Investigation about associations of permissions can reveal some patterns against 
attacks. In this regards, this paper proposes an approach based on sequence alignment between requested 
permissions to identify similarities between applications. Permission patterns for malicious and normal samples 
are determined and exploited to evaluate a similarity score. The nature of an application is obtained based on a 
threshold, judiciously computed. Experiments have been realized with a dataset of 534 malicious samples (300 
training and 234 testing) and 534 normal samples (300 training and 234 testing). Our approach has been able to 
recognize testing samples (either malware or normal) with an accuracy of 79%, an average precision of 76% and 
an average recall of 75%. This research reveals that sequence alignment can improve malware detection 
research. 
Keywords: Sequence alignment; permissions; Android; malicious; normal. 
1. Introduction 
Android is the mobile operating system most popular and is forecasted to remain popular until 2022 [1]. Its 
openness and popularity attracts malicious people which exploit sophisticated techniques to destroy their targets 
[2]. Android relies on the use of normal and dangerous permissions to control access to resources [3].  
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
* Corresponding author.  
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Permissions are dangerous if they filter access to critical user resources. They are normal if once granted to an 
application, the risk is low. However, attackers exploit these permissions with bad intentions. Indeed, they try to 
combine multiple permissions to maliciously gain privilege levels to unauthorized resources [4].  Authors made 
several proposals based on permissions for detecting malware [5]. Authors exploit specific permissions to make 
decisions [6], combine permissions with other features and machine learning algorithms [7–9] and raise user 
awareness about risks to grant some permissions [6, 10, 11]. In this work, we use permissions as footprints to 
derive similarities among applications. Sequence alignment is so powerful in bioinformatics because it 
determines similarity between gene sequences [12], so that authors exploit them in data science [13] and for 
malware detection [14]. This work adapts this approach to determine similarity based on permissions for 
malicious and normal families. The adaptation of local alignment here supposes, as in reality, no order between 
apparitions of permissions. The proposed approach determines a DeoxyriboNucleic Acid (DNA) based 
permissions for the malicious family and do likewise for the normal family. Then, it computes a classification 
threshold based on the similarity score between the DNA of the tested application and the family DNAs. 
Experiments have been realized with a dataset of 600 samples (300 training and 300 testing) and 752 normal 
(326 training and 326 testing) applications. Our approach has been able to recognize testing samples (either 
malware or normal) with an accuracy of 79.58. This work reveals that Android applications are somehow 
similar based on their permissions. All the artefacts supporting this work are found in [15].  The rest of the 
document is structured in xxx sections.  The first section presents concepts about sequence alignment and 
permissions. The second section presents the proposed approach. The third section presents results and 
discussions. The document ends with a conclusion and some perspectives. 
2. Background 
This section relates main concepts about sequence alignment and permissions.  
2.1. Permissions 
An application requests a permission to make operations on resources [3]. Such resources can be critical or 
sensitive to the user security. In this case, Google classifies protection permissions as dangerous. Permissions 
are normal when they protect less risky data. Android automatically prompts the user to either grant or deny 
dangerous permissions. Signature permissions include permissions granted at install time to applications signed 
by the same certificate as the application that defines those permissions. Permissions are declared in the 
manifest file by the developer based on application requirements. For example, if the application needs to send 
data to a distant server, the developer will add INTERNET permission. If the application needs to read contacts, 
the manifest file will include READ_CONTACTS. This work considers any type of permissions. 
2.2. Sequence alignment  
Sequence alignment is a technique used in bioinformatics to represent two or more sequences one under the 
other, to highlight common regions between DNAs [12]. The purpose of alignment is to arrange the components 
to identify areas of agreement. These alignments are carried out by software whose objective is to maximize the 
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number of coincidences of the elements in the different sequences. There are two types of alignments. The local 
alignment makes possible to search for similarity between parts of sequences whereas global alignment the 
whole sequences to perform. Local alignment is the most used since it is not as strict as the global alignment. 
The example illustrates a local alignment. It presents two sequences (TGK-G and AGKVG) with three 
similarities (second position, third position and fifth position) and two differences (first position and fourth 
position).  
T G K – G  
A G K V G  
It gives a score of alignment equals to       
                                     
 
 
         
 
     
, where 
  {
       
          
 
This work takes a DNA element as a permission. Since developers just include their appearance in the manifest 
file, the sequence order is not relevant for applications. Let consider the two manifests in Table 1.  
Table 1:  Manifest examples 
Manifest 1 Manifest 2 
INTERNET WRITE_SMS 
READ_CONTACTS READ_PHONE_STATE 
WRITE_CONTACTS INTERNET 
WRITE_SMS READ_CONTACTS 
 
The position in which a permission appears is not important. A possible DNA of the first manifest is 
(INTERNET - READ_CONTACTS - WRITE_CONTACTS - WRITE_SMS) and the second (INTERNET-
READ_CONTACTS -  -  - WRITE_SMS). The sequence alignment in this case is 
INTERNET    READ_CONTACTS   WRITE_CONTACTS   WRITE_SMS 
 INTERNET    READ_CONTACTS           ----               WRITE_SMS 
      
       
 
     
2.3. Evaluation measures 
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Some metrics are used within the scope of this work to test the reliability of the similarity approach
a
.  
 True Positive (TP): It the number of malware correctly detected as malware. 
 True Negative (TN): It is the number of benign samples correctly detected as normal 
 False Positive (FP): It the number of malware incorrectly detected as malware. 
 False Negative (FN): It is the number of benign samples incorrectly detected as normal 
 Accuracy: It is the rate of correctly detected samples within the whole dataset 
         
     
           
 
 Precision for positive: It is the proportion of malware identifications which was actually correct. 
                  
  
     
 
 Precision for negative: It is the proportion of benign identifications which was actually correct. 
                  
  
     
 
 Recall: It is the proportion of actual malware that was identified correctly. 
       
  
     
 
3. Methodology 
Our approach to detecting android malware uses techniques used in bioinformatics to detect similarity regions 
between sequences DNA, RNA and others. For our case, it is a question of detecting regions of similarity 
between malicious Android applications using their sequences of permissions, which, unlike DNA sequences, 
do not change according to the order of appearance of the permissions. The goal here is to find a score based on 
sequence alignment between the DNA of any tested application and the DNA of the whole malware samples. 
Then to compute a similarity threshold from which a decision making can be made whether an application is 
normal or malicious. To achieve this objective, this study follows different steps: 
 Structuration of applications: This step aims to extract relevant information such as permission and to 
organize them.  
 Threshold determination: This step selects the threshold value providing the best classification 
performance, according to the dataset of malware. 
 Malware detection: This step experiments the detection of malware and normal based on the similarity 
threshold. 
                                                          
a
 https://developers.google.com/machine-learning/crash-course/classification/video-lecture  
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3.1.  Structuring the dataset 
Let be     , the set of malicious samples and     , the set of normal samples. We extract the manifest file 
AndroidManifest.xml of each application A belonging to     . These permissions are included in AllPerm. The 
set of permissions of A is                {                 }   
Now we remove duplicated permissions to obtain the DNA of A called                    . 
                      {                                           } 
The sets of distinct permissions for each application are merged to obtain the DNA of the whole malware 
dataset, namely             
            {                            } 
We create CountModelMal which is the set of occurrences for each permission belonging to             and 
CountModelNor which is the set of occurrences of each permission belonging to             in the set of 
normal applications     . 
                {                                                     } 
                keeps the gap between occurrences of the frequent permissions used by malware and 
occurrences of these permissions in benign applications. It measures therefore the degree of representativeness 
of permissions in malicious and benign applications.  
3.2. Threshold determination 
This phase aims to define from which value an application is similar to a malware or goodware. The following 
pseudo-code is performed to achieve this task. The objective is to find the best threshold which discriminates 
efficiently between malicious and normal. 
Algorithm 1: Determination of threshold 
Begin 
1. Inputs:      and      ; Output:   
2. We sum up all possible occurrences of permissions of malware 
                                                     
3. for any          
For any application u in EMal  
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a. Determine the DNA of s,                     
b. Compute the sequence alignment score scorealignment between its DNA and             
               ∑                       , Position is the index for each permissions included in the 
DNA of u 
c. if  
              
 
   then TP=TP+1 
else FN=FN+1 
endif 
  endfor 
for any application v in ENor 
d. Determine the DNA of v,                     
e. Compute the sequence alignment score scorealignment between its DNA and             
               ∑                       , Position is the indexes of permissions included in the 
DNA of v  
f. if  
              
 
   then FP=FP+1 
else TN=TN+1 
endif 
endfor 
g. compute five performance metrics : accuracy, precisionpositive, precisionnegative and recall. 
          
     
           
,                   
  
     
 ,                   
  
     
;                
  
     
,                
  
     
 
h. compute the recall gap (Diff_Recall) such that                                               
      endfor 
4. select   such that                         ) 
5. if there is only one   that meets the previous condition return   
6. else if there are several  s, return               
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End 
There are two datasets: malicious samples and normal samples (line 1). The sequence alignment between its 
DNA and the DNA of the whole malware is applied for every malicious and normal sample A (lines 3.b and 
3.e). Then, we compute a score based on found permissions in A by summing their occurrence gaps within the 
malicious dataset (lines 3.b and 3.e). This score is exploited to check whether the sample is correctly classified 
or not. Several metrics are saved for each threshold (lines 3.c and 3.f). They are True Positive (TP), False 
Negative (FN), True Negative (TN), False Negative (FN), Accuracy, Precision for malware, Precision for 
normal applications and Recall (line 3.g). We finally select the threshold with acceptable accuracy, precisions 
and recall simultaneously (line 4). This condition is not exclusive because accuracy alone is not enough for 
class-imbalanced dataset. That is why we couple the other metrics such as precision and recall. 
3.3. Malware detection  
This phase aims to decide whether an application is malicious or benign based on the selected threshold  .  
We test the condition 
              
 
  . If it is satisfied then the application is malware. Otherwise, it is a 
benign application.  
 0.9 < accuracy <1, the approach is  excellent 
 0.8 < accuracy <0.9, the approach  is  good 
 0.7 < accuracy <0.8, the approach  is  acceptable 
 0.6 < accuracy <0.7, the approach is not good  
4. Experiments and results 
This section describes experiments and discusses results. 
4.1. Datasets 
We have gathered 1252 samples including 626 malicious and 626 benign applications. The dataset of malicious 
samples is split into 300 training samples to determine the threshold and 326 testing samples to evaluate the 
model. Likewise, the dataset of benign samples is split into 300 training samples to determine the threshold and 
326 testing samples to evaluate the model. We have ensured that malicious and benign samples are disjoints as 
well as both training and testing for malicious and normal. We proceeded by checking the contents and hashed 
of each application. We collected the malicious samples from the Android malware dataset CICAndMal2017
b
. 
We collected the benign samples from Google Play. 
Tools exploited  
                                                          
b
 https://www.unb.ca/cic/datasets/andmal2017.html  
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We have used the apktool 2.3.4 to reverse engineer applications from binary into readable data. Moreover, we 
used Python 2.7 with pandas library, numpi, csv, lxml and other libraries to dissect permissions of applications. 
4.2. Threshold determination 
We have experimented this phase with 300 malicious and 300 benign samples. Details of extraction are 
available in the Github page dedicated to this study [15]. A script written in Python has been used to automate 
the threshold process. The ADN of the whole malware with occurrences of each permission is also available in 
[15]. Table 2 shows the results obtained. We see that more the threshold grows more the precision for positive 
and recall for negative tend to 1. It means in this case that the model is more precise to detect malware. In the 
contrary, the model is more precise for detection of benign applications when the threshold tends to zero 
(precision for negative). However, decision making is not made based on metrics taken separately and should be 
optimal for malware and benign applications simultaneously. 
Table 2: Experiments for the threshold determination 
We observe that that the lowest recall gap is 0.05 and two thresholds correspond to it. The first is 0.5 and the 
Thres
hold 
TP FN TN FP 
Precision 
for 
positive 
Precision 
for 
negative 
Recall 
for 
negative 
Recall for 
positive 
Diff_R
ecall 
Accur
acy 
0.05 293 7 55 245 0,54 0,88 0,18 0,97 0,79 0,58 
0.1 293 7 68 232 0,55 0,90 0,22 0,97 0,75 0,60 
0.15 282 18 83 217 0,56 0,82 0,27 0,94 0,66 0,60 
0.2 273 27 99 201 0,57 0,78 0,33 0,91 0,58 0,62 
0.25 266 34 126 174 0,60 0,78 0,42 0,88 0,46 0,65 
0.3 264 36 150 150 0,63 0,80 0,5 0,88 0,38 0,69 
0.35 260 40 168 132 0,66 0,80 0,56 0,86 0,30 0,71 
0.4 256 44 195 105 0,70 0,81 0,65 0,85 0,20 0,75 
0.45 248 52 217 83 0,74 0,80 0,72 0,82 0,10 0,77 
0.5 247 53 232 68 0,78 0,81 0,77 0,82 0,05 0,79 
0.55 229 71 244 56 0,80 0,77 0,81 0,76 0,05 0,78 
0.6 222 78 260 40 0,84 0,76 0,86 0,74 0,12 0,80 
0.65 212 88 280 20 0,91 0,76 0,93 0,70 0,22 0,82 
0.7 206 94 283 17 0,92 0,75 0,94 0,68 0,25 0,81 
0.75 184 116 285 15 0,92 0,71 0,95 0,61 0,33 0,78 
0.8 163 137 288 12 0,93 0,677 0,96 0,54 0,41 0,75 
0.85 149 151 289 11 0,93 0,65 0,96 0,49 0,46 0,73 
0.9 135 165 292 8 0,94 0,63 0,97 0,45 0,52 0,71 
0.95 131 169 293 7 0,94 0,63 0,97 0,43 0,54 0,70 
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second 0.55. According to Algorithm 1, we take the mean of both. That means, the threshold is 0.525. This 
threshold will be used for classification. 
4.3. Evaluation of classification 
Two new distinct datasets are exploited for testing the similarity approach. Table 3 is obtained with 234 
malicious samples and 234 normal samples under a threshold of 0.525. 
Table 3: Performance results 
Thresho
ld 
TP 
F
N 
T
N 
F
P 
Precision for 
positive 
Precision for 
negative 
Recall for 
negative 
Recall for 
positive 
Accura
cy 
0.525 
19
4 
40 
17
7 
5
7 
0,71 0,81 0,69 0,82 0,79 
This model is accurate with 79% of correct detections with an average precision of 76%. The model is more 
precise to detect normal (81%) than malware (71%). However, the model is able to correctly observe 82% of 
malware (recall of 82%).  Although these results demonstrate that our approach is reliable, we note that forty 
malware and 57 benign applications that are mistakenly classified. An association with features such API and 
code monitoring as well as runtime analysis can reveal other traces to improve this classification.  
5. Related work 
Several authors have made two orientations to identify malware based on permissions. The first orientation 
includes works which rely only permissions to raise risk levels to assist users being aware. Sarma and his 
colleagues [6] propose an approach using the permissions requested by an application, its category and what 
permissions are requested by other applications in the same category to better inform users about the risks of 
installing this application really fits with its objectives. PUREDroid [10] evaluates the security risk related to 
granted dangerous permissions as well as their negative impact. Al Jutail and his colleagues [11] propose to 
build an application to monitor for dangers associated to permissions of the scanned applications. Then, this tool 
presents results in an understandable manner to the normal user who can therefore determine whether an 
application can affect privacy or not. The second orientation includes works which combine permissions to 
other features using machine learning. Its main objective is to improve detection performance. DroidAPIMiner 
[9] associates dangerous APIs and critical permissions, and other features with machine learning algorithms. Liu 
and Liu […] rely on requested permissions and required permissions as features of machine learning techniques 
to classify an application as benign or malicious. Drebin [16] associates static analysis of permissions and 
Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) with machine learning to identify malware. SaMaDroid [8] 
proposes a three-level detection architecture which extracts requested permissions, APIs and other features from 
the manifest. These features, once structured, are transferred to the learning process to guess the class of the 
application. Likewise, SigPID [4] retrieves significant permissions from applications, structures this information 
to effectively detect malware using supervised learning algorithms. This work does not aim to raise awareness 
about permissions or to look for features providing better performance. But, it relies on the sequence alignment 
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principle to find the optimal score similarity between the query application and the permission DNAs of 
malware. It is more lightweight than the second orientation’s works.  
6. Conclusion  
This work has proposed a malware detection based on the alignment of permissions. This work relies on 
sequence alignment principle to determine similarity based on permissions for malicious and normal families. A 
classification threshold based on the similarity score between the DNA of the tested application and the family 
DNAs, is determined. Experiments has been realized on dataset of 600 samples (300 training and 300 testing) 
and 752 normal (326 training and 326 testing) applications. The proposed approach is able to recognize testing 
samples (either malware or normal) with an accuracy of 79.58. This work reveals that Android applications are 
somehow similar based on their permissions. However, we still have to improve by combining with other 
approaches and other features to improve detection performance. 
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